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Back in 2000, the burst of the IT bubble sunk global equities.  Regardless, five out of ten 
GICS sectors had positive returns over that year. Global equity sectors rotation might 
become even more relevant as globalisation/integration evolve, with industry effects 
eventually taking over country effects. This paper details the set-up and performance of 
a sector rotation systematic strategy, supporting Millennium BCP’s Wealth Management 
Unit on its asset allocation procedures. It is shown that momentum and low-volatility 
“anomalies” are evidenced at industry level, macroeconomic indicators support a choice 
between cyclical/defensive sectors, and that specific factors further fine-tune an efficient 
rotation.  













This paper aims to build a systematic strategy to handle the relevance of global equity 
sectors rotation, by combining some of the most widely studied factors with several others 
also found to be significant drivers of sector returns, adding to the actual research by 
further studying how “each industrial sector responds to macroeconomic factors, 
economic policies, and news in a different and unique way” (Lamponi, 2014).  
The sectors within which the strategy aims to efficiently allocate capital are the 
following1:  
1. Materials; Companies that manufacture chemicals, building materials and paper 
products. This sector also includes companies engaged in commodities 
exploration and processing. 
2. Telecoms; Companies that provide communication services using fixed-line 
networks or those that provide wireless access and services. This sector also 
includes companies that provide internet services such as access, navigation and 
internet related software and services. 
3. Consumer Discretionary; This sector includes retail stores, auto and auto parts 
manufacturers, companies engaged in residential construction, lodging facilities, 
restaurants and entertainment companies. 
4. Consumer Staples; Companies engaged in the manufacturing of food, beverages, 
household and personal products, packaging, or tobacco. Also includes companies 
that provide services such as education & training services. 
5. Energy; Companies that produce or refine oil and gas, oil field services and 
equipment companies, and pipeline operators. 
                                                             
1 Description as in the Morningstar Global Equity Classification Structure.  
6. Financials; Companies that provide financial services which includes banks, 
savings and loans, asset management companies, credit services, investment 
brokerage firms, and insurance companies. 
7. Healthcare; This sector includes biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, research 
services, home healthcare, hospitals, long-term care facilities, and medical 
equipment and supplies. 
8. Industrials; Companies that manufacture machinery, hand-held tools and 
industrial products. This sector also includes aerospace and defense firms as well 
as companied engaged in transportations and logistic services. 
9. Information Technology (IT); Companies engaged in the design, development, 
and support of computer operating systems and applications. This sector also 
includes companies that provide computer technology consulting services. Also 
includes companies engaged in the manufacturing of computer equipment, data 
storage products, networking products, semi¬conductors, and components. 
10. Utilities; Electric, gas, and water utilities. 
Note that Morningstar Global Equity Classification Structure also classifies equities into 
the Real Estate sector. However, the amount of data regarding such index prices is limited, 
and therefore this sector was excluded to allow a backtest across a larger time-series, 
guaranteeing its robustness.  
Remarkably, the different ways in which each sector responds to new information is quite 
visible in the following table of annual returns in US dollars for the MSCI Global Sector 
Indexes. 
Figure 1 – Calendar returns in US dollars for the MSCI Global Sector Indexes. 
 
The figure above highlights some interesting facts. Firstly, that the burst of the IT bubble 
in 2000 dragged the MSCI World down by 14.1%, but regardless of that half of the sectors 
had positive annual returns2, some even with double-digit figures, stressing out the 
importance of an effective sectoral allocation. On the other hand, during the global 
financial crisis in 2008 correlations across risky assets surged, not leaving any room for 
a long-only strategy of equity sector rotation to provide positive absolute returns (despite 
that it still might prove quite effective to outperform its benchmark in relative terms 3).  
Taking this into consideration, the strategy intends to rotate across equity sectors in order 
to enhance risk-adjusted returns and avoid huge draw-downs4, by combining technical 
factors, macroeconomic factors and specific factors. Note that, for the purpose of 
systematically adjusting the strategy to the distinct phases of macroeconomic cycles, the 
aforementioned sectors were divided into two groups: 
                                                             
2 Health-Care, Financials, Energy, Utilities and Consumer Staples. 
3 In 2008, Defensive sectors significantly outperformed Cyclical sectors (returns were less negative). 
4 Namely the ones of provided by a buy-and-hold allocation to the MSCI World.  


















1997 14.2% 22.6% 35.6% 17.2% 17.4% 10.2% 22.2% -11.6% 0.7% 22.7% 7.7%
1998 22.8% 68.0% 35.2% 10.9% 2.3% 20.8% 50.1% -2.0% 6.2% 20.6% 24.4%
1999 23.6% 99.6% -11.1% 6.6% 19.9% -14.9% 42.8% 26.0% 25.8% -17.2% 31.6%
2000 -14.1% -41.8% 25.5% 8.5% 4.3% 19.6% -41.7% -14.9% -2.6% 9.1% -24.2%
2001 -17.8% -29.7% -14.0% -18.3% -8.8% -24.2% -26.4% -6.8% -16.8% -9.8% -11.0%
2002 -21.1% -38.8% -18.9% -18.0% -8.4% -18.6% -30.4% -6.3% -23.5% -4.8% -23.2%
2003 30.8% 47.6% 18.0% 35.5% 22.9% 23.9% 22.8% 41.9% 35.9% 14.7% 35.7%
2004 12.8% 2.1% 4.7% 14.8% 25.3% 24.3% 14.7% 15.7% 17.5% 9.9% 13.6%
2005 7.6% 4.2% 7.6% 8.7% 26.2% 9.7% -12.5% 17.1% 10.2% 3.9% 0.0%
2006 18.0% 8.6% 9.0% 20.9% 15.8% 31.5% 27.8% 26.2% 16.8% 18.0% 19.3%
2007 7.1% 14.4% 2.5% -10.5% 27.5% 18.5% 17.9% 31.2% 13.6% 16.3% -4.5%
2008 -42.1% -44.4% -22.9% -55.6% -39.4% -31.4% -35.6% -51.0% -44.2% -24.9% -42.8%
2009 27.0% 50.9% 16.4% 27.7% 22.9% 2.0% 8.6% 58.4% 23.9% 18.6% 37.3%
2010 9.6% 9.5% 0.4% 2.3% 9.5% -4.5% 5.3% 19.4% 21.3% 10.1% 22.8%
2011 -7.6% -3.4% 7.2% -20.7% -1.9% -6.8% -4.1% -21.2% -10.0% 6.0% -6.3%
2012 13.2% 12.0% 15.1% 25.6% -0.5% -1.9% 1.7% 9.0% 13.5% 10.7% 22.3%
2013 24.1% 27.2% 33.9% 24.3% 15.3% 8.9% 26.6% 1.2% 29.7% 18.6% 37.3%
2014 2.9% 14.7% 16.3% 0.9% -13.7% 12.0% -5.0% -7.1% -1.3% 5.0% 2.4%
2015 -2.7% 3.6% 5.2% -5.6% -25.0% -9.3% -0.6% -17.2% -3.8% 4.2% 4.0%
2016 5.3% 10.1% -8.3% 9.4% 22.8% 2.9% 2.4% 20.1% 10.8% -0.4% 1.5%
1. Cyclical sectors; Sectors driven by the real economy, and thus procyclical with 
economic growth - when the economy is in an expansion these sectors tend to 
outperform, and when the economy is in a downturn these sectors tend to 
underperform. In other words, these sectors most likely have a beta greater than 
1. Thus, the following sectors were identified as cyclicals: IT, Consumer 
Discretionary, Industrials, Materials, Energy and Financials. 
2. Defensive sectors; Sectors whose core business model focus on providing 
goods/services that the average consumer considers as essential to its lifestyle, 
and thus requires them regardless of the stage of the economic cycle. These sectors 
tend to underperform in economic expansions and to outperform in recessions, 
usually leading to a beta lower than 1. The following sectors were identified as 
defensives: Health Care, Utilities, Telecoms and Consumer Staples. 
Literature Review 
Far-reaching research have adressed the importance of an efficient global equity sector 
rotation. Richard A. Weiss (1998) argues that as capital markets become highly 
integrated, and should globalisation trends continue, industry effect will be as important 
as (if not more important) than country effect as a source of risk diversification. 
Moreover, “as political boundaries become less important, the factors of production that 
drive various industries will become the single most important determinant of global asset 
returns”. Furthermore, as the author also argues, an overweight in a certain country might 
implicitly, and maybe unintentionally, become an overweight in a certain sector (for 
instance, an overweight in Australia will most likely be exposed to the same risks as an 
overweight in natural resources). 
Chong & Phillips (2015) evaluated the incorporation of several macroeconomic factors 
in sector rotation strategies. This followed research on how sector rotation strategies 
based on changes in the Federal Reserve monetary policy were especially effective during 
restrictive monetary periods, by taking a defensive posture - in such periods, the strategy 
registered returns twice that of the benchmark but with much less risk (Conover, Jensen, 
Johnson, & Mercer, 2008). 
The research on industry momentum investment strategies is also extensive. O’Neal 
(2000) tested the performance of a momentum strategy on sector funds, observing that 
“portfolios of previous top-performing industry funds far out-stripped portfolios of 
previous poor performers”, and further research argues that such strategies “appear highly 
profitable” even after controlling for several risk exposures or microstructure influences 
(Moskowitz, Grinblatt, Journal, & Meeting, 2016). 
Methodology 
The benchmark of the strategy is an equally weighted portfolio of the MSCI Global 
Industry Indexes (i.e, an equally weighted portfolio of the aforementioned described ten 
GICS sectors). Global equities were chosen to fully isolate industry effects from country 
effects. Weiss (1998) argues that “the only fair test of sector rotation would be performed 
on a global basis, as only through global diversification can one mitigate country risk and 
thereby achieve a pure industry allocation”. Note also the reasoning behind the choice of 
an equally weighted benchmark instead of a market-weighted benchmark: this choice was 
not only due to the benefits of its simpler computations, but also because it makes it easier 
to interpret the convictions in each sector as well as the interactions among the analysed 
factors. Moreover, research shows that an EW portfolio tends to outperforms the value- 
and price-weighted portfolios in terms of risk-adjusted performance (Plyakha, Uppal, & 
Vilkov, 2012). 
Then, each month, by combining the systematic rules described below, each sector might 
receive a final overweight or underweight (i.e, an active weight relative to the weight in 
the benchmark). Note that each overweight to a sector must be financed with an 
underweight to another, ensuring that weights still sum to 100%. In other words, the main 
purpose of the strategy is not to forecast absolute returns, but to allocate capital in such a 
way that it gives a greater weight to sectors that are expected to perform better than others 
in relative terms. If that is achieved in a consistent and robust manner, then the strategy 
will outperform its benchmark. 
The backtest is made in a data period ranging from January of 1996 to September of 2017. 
A long-only and a long-short strategy5 were backtested. The systematic approach follows 
the same ideological rules for the two strategies, and therefore both strategies aim to test 
the resilience of the same factors/theoretical background. The only difference is that in 
the long-short strategy the amplitude of the overweights/underweights is greater, such 
that weights become more extreme and, eventually, underweights become short-
positions. The active weights described further on refer to the long-only strategy unless 
stated otherwise6. Regardless of the wider tracking error, the long-short strategy was 
found to be useful as, being a “high-conviction strategy” (reflected in its more extreme 
active weights), it could more properly gauge the effect of each factor in performance, 
since the effect of each factor is amplified and therefore easily distinguished in a ceteris-
paribus framework.  
The systematic rules used can be briefly summarized in three main sets: 
I - Technical factors: each month, the ten sectors are ranked by their momentum 
(an average of previous 1 month, 3 months, 6 months and 12 months returns) and 
                                                             
5 The long-short strategy is a net-long strategy, as weights in each sector still sum to 100%. 
6 To obtain the active weights for the long-short strategy, multiply the weights referred by a factor of 4. 
historical volatility (standard deviation of returns in the past 12 months). Then, a final 
rank is computed by averaging the ranking of a sector’s momentum with the ranking of a 
sector’s low volatility7, for the purpose to have an ordered list with the sectors that 
experienced the greatest momentum with the lowest possible volatility.  
II - Macroeconomic factors: Credit Risk is measured by the US High Yield OAS 
index, and if it is above (below) its 6 months moving average an underweight 
(overweight) is given to cyclical sectors (vice-versa for defensive sectors); ISM New 
Orders, a leading economic indicator, favours cyclicals (defensives) if above (below) its 
6 months moving average; and the slope of the Yield Curve for United States Treasury 
Bonds, defined as the difference between the 10Y UST yield and the 2Y UST yield, also 
used to try to forecast future economic activity, favouring cyclical sectors if it is positive 
and its slope increased relative to the past month, while favouring defensive sectors if it 
is negative or its slope decreased relative to the previous month. 
III - Specific factors: The previous technical and macroeconomic convictions are 
fine-tuned to some specific factors, regarding the importance of such key specific drivers. 
Namely, convictions about the future performance of Energy and Materials sectors are 
systematically adjusted for the performance of the underlying commodities8; the position 
in Financials vs Defensive sectors is systematically adjusted to the movement in market 
yields, given that interest rates are a key driver of banks’ future profits, while acting as a 
drag to Defensives that are, among equity sectors, the better bond proxies9; and finally, 
the conviction in Industrials is systematically adjusted given the monthly reading of the 
                                                             
7 A marginally higher ponderation was given to the momentum factor, in order to avoid an eventual tie 
between sectors. 
8 The chosen underlying commodity for Energy equities was WTI Oil, while for Materials equities it was 
considered an index of Industrial Metals. 
9 Defensives tend to underperform when yields increase, and vice-versa. 
ISM Manufacturing, a leading indicator computed given managers’ expectations about 
the manufacturing sector. 
Following, the rationale behind each set of factors is described more intensively, as well 
as the systematic rules used to act upon them. 
Methodology I - Technical factors 
The main idea is to combine two of the most intensively researched financial markets’ 
anomalies: that a portfolio of low-volatility assets tends to outperform one composed of 
high-volatility assets  (Ang, Hodrick, Xing, & Zhang, 2009), and that “industry 
momentum investment strategies, which buy stocks from past winning industries and sell 
stocks from past losing industries, appear highly profitable” even after controlling for 
several risk exposures or microstructure influences (Moskowitz, Grinblatt, Journal, & 
Meeting, 2016). This combination is not unpremeditated, as it aims to control the crash 
risk from investing in momentum: as Barroso & Santa Clara (2015) found, the risk of 
momentum is highly variable but also highly predictable, and that “managing this risk 
virtually eliminates crashes”. While the previous authors use an estimate of momentum 
risk to scale the exposure to the momentum strategy – in order to have a constant risk 
over time -, here the proceeding aims to follow from the intuition behind that result: for 
instance, if certain sector has the greatest momentum but also the highest volatility, its 
ranking would be somewhat neutralized in order to avoid the overweight that a plain-
vanilla momentum strategy would attribute to that sector. A final ranking is thus 
computed, and partial active weights10 are attributed accordingly. In the long-only 
                                                             
10 Partial active weights in the sense that this is a contribution to the final active weight. Namely, the final 
active weight in a sector equals the sum of the partial active weights obtained by the methodology applied 
to each set of factors (technical + macroeconomic + specific). For instance, a sector might have the 
greatest momentum and the lowest volatility, but if macroeconomic/specific factors are disadvantageous 
to that conviction, the final qualitative conviction in that sector would depend on whether the former 
offset the latter. 
strategy, the sector that ranks first receives an overweight of 5%, the one that ranks second 
an overweight of 4%, then 2.5%, followed by 1.0% and finally 0.5%; for the worst five 
ranked sectors, the underweights are symmetric (i.e the sector that ranks in tenth receives 
an underweight of 5%, and so on11).  
Despite recognizing that momentum might be described as a market anomaly, there is 
behavioural theory that can explain its existence and, more importantly, the high 
likelihood of its persistence. In the Daniel et al. (1998) model, investors exhibit 
overconfidence and self-attribution biases, which might exaggerate and extend industry 
mispricing. Moreover, under the Barberis et al.(1998) model, investors also exhibit 
representativeness bias, causing them to become too optimistic (pessimistic) about firms 
with a sequence of good (bad) news, and then extrapolating those news from a single firm 
to the industry level, contributing to industry momentum – this model was motivated by 
the idea of Griffin and Tversky (1992) that people pay too much attention to the strength 
of the news they are presented with but too little attention to its statistical weight. And, 
while it is true that often there is indeed an overreaction that might lead to a future sharp 
reversals in asset valuations, it is also true that one would be forfeiting significant returns 
in the meantime: Thaler & De Bondt (1985) argue that “most people tend to “overreact” 
to unexpected and dramatic news events”, but also recognize that such “overreactions” 
can last several months without a correction in prices. The best as one can get might well 
be given by the described combination of momentum and low volatility, which 
significantly decreases the crash risk inherent to a plain-vanilla momentum investing 
strategy. In fact, if one would use the recommended global equity sectors rotation strategy 
(the further steps are described below) but with a simple momentum strategy instead of 
                                                             
11 Conclusions and final results would be very similar if the values chosen for active weights applied to 
any factor were different (i.e, within a reasonable bound, and if they do not change the rationale behind 
the factor used, obviously).  
its combination with the low volatility factor (keeping the use of other factors constant), 
the maximum drawdown (i.e, the crash risk) would be higher12. 
Methodology II - Macroeconomic factors 
While the previous described combination of the momentum and low volatility factors 
partly contributes to the conviction in each sector, those convictions are fine-tuned 
suitably to the macroeconomic environment verified in that month. Thus, this step 
systematically adds to the previous preliminary active weights an additional 
overweight/underweight to cyclical or defensive sectors, depending on the signs flashed 
by the macroeconomic indicators described below. Note that, due to the lack of some 
economic indicators for the global economy (which would be the most appropriate ones, 
as the strategy invests in global equities), the United States’ economy was chosen as a 
proxy for the global economy, and therefore the chosen indicators regard that specific 
economy. 
Mishkin & Estrella (2000) advocate the use of the yield curve as an excellent indicator of 
a possible future recession, as it “significantly outperforms other financial and 
macroeconomic indicators in predicting recessions two to six quarters ahead”. Its efficacy 
as forecast tool is robust, and despite being a simple indicator, it includes information that 
influences economic activity, such as the current monetary policy, expectations of future 
inflation and real interest rates, for instance. In this paper, the yield curve is defined as: 
Yield curve = 10 year US Treasury yield – 2 year US Treasury yield 
Economic growth tends to be reflected by a positive yield curve. The drivers that shape 
the yield curve depend on the stage of the economic cycle, but generally reflects easing 
                                                             
12 For the long-only strategy, the maximum drawdown would be 51% instead of 49%; for the long-short 
strategy, the maximum drawdown would be 46% instead of 41%. 
financial conditions (central banks might have just lowered short-term interest rates, with 
the intent to accelerate economic growth after a recession) and/or robust growth 
expectations ahead (higher real interest rates or higher inflation expectations in the long-
run, for instance). A steepening of the yield curve is interpreted as positive for economic 
growth too (and thus for risky assets, favouring cyclical sectors over defensive ones), as 
it simply shows that the yield curve has just became more positive than before. 
On the other hand, an inversion of the yield curve (which is, necessarily, preceded by a 
flattening) might signal an economic slowdown or a recession ahead. It can also have 
plentiful drivers, but generally it might reflect a tightening in financial conditions (for 
instance, as central banks hike policy rates to cool down inflation) and/or that future 
economic growth expectations have declined (reflected in lower real interest rates or 
lower inflation expectations in the long-run).  
Therefore, in this strategy, if the yield curve is positive and steeper than in the previous 
month, it is attributed an overweight (+1%) to cyclicals and an underweight (-1%) to 
defensive sectors. Conversely, if the yield curve is negative or flatter than in the previous 
month, it is attributed an overweight (+1%) to defensives and an underweight (-1%) to 
cyclical sectors. 
Despite the usefulness of the yield curve as a predictor of recessions, in this strategy this 
indicator is complemented with two other macroeconomic/financial indicators for the 
sake of strengthening the confidence in the assessment of the macroeconomic 
environment. 
Thus, the strategy also looks out at credit risk13 – measured by the US High-Yield Option 
Adjusted Spread. If credit risk is below its 6 month moving average, the strategy adds an 
overweight (+1%) to cyclicals and an underweight (-1%) to defensives; conversely, if 
credit risk is above its 6 month moving average, the strategy adds an overweight (+1%) 
to defensives and an underweight (-1%) to cyclicals.  
Finally, the strategy also works with a signal coming from the New Orders sub-index of 
the ISM Manufacturing, a leading indicator to gauge real economic growth: if it is above 
its 6 month moving average, the strategy adds an overweight (+1%) to cyclicals and an 
underweight (-1%) to defensives; if it is below its 6 month moving average, the strategy 
adds an overweight (+1%) to defensives and an underweight (-1%) to cyclicals. 
Methodology III - Specific factors 
Finally, there were also identified several specific factors as meaningful drivers of returns 
in certain sectors. Firstly, the returns of commodity-related sectors (i.e., Energy and 
Materials), as one would intuitively expect, are strongly positively correlated to the 
performance of the underlying commodities, a key driver for the earnings of those sectors. 
While the demand for commodity prices is expected to be cyclical with macroeconomic 
activity (the reason why these two sectors were previously defined as Cyclicals), supply 
shocks are harder to forecast (for instance, current themes include the resilience/cost 
structure of US Shale Oil Producers, or the extent to which Chinese authorities will 
implement measures to curb environmental pollution). That said, the intent here is not to 
forecast eventual structural changes but to adapt to them. Thus, the strategy adjusts the 
conviction of where one is headed in the economic cycle (cyclical sectors vs defensive 
sectors) to the recent performance of the underlying commodities, which is a key 
                                                             
13 Following some intuition from Chan-Lau (2006), where the author uses the prices of publicly traded 
securities to assess systemic risk and stress testing financial systems. 
fundamental driver to Energy and Materials equities. To capture these dynamics, the 
strategy uses a signal that gives an overweight of +2.5% (underweight of -2.5%) to 
Energy when WTI oil prices are above (below) its 6 months moving average. Similarly, 
the strategy uses a signal that gives an overweight of +2.5% (underweight of -2.5%) to 
Materials when Industrial Metals14 prices are above (below) its 6 months moving average. 
These overweights (underweights) are financed by small underweights (overweights) to 
all other equity sectors. 
Furthermore, the strategy also uses the ISM Manufacturing Report On Business for the 
United States (again as a proxy for the global economy) to gauge a specific conviction on 
the Industrials sector. This indicator is based on monthly questionnaires answered by 
members of the ISM Business Survey Committee. As stated by the ISM, a reading “over 
50 represents growth or expansion within the manufacturing sector of the economy 
compared with the prior month; a reading under 50 represents contraction, and a reading 
at 50 indicates an equal balance between manufacturers reporting advances and declines 
in their business”. Thus, the strategy attributes an overweight (+2.5%) to Industrials if the 
ISM is above 50 and increased compared to the previous month’s reading (i.e, if 
manufacturer’s expect an expansion at a faster pace than in the month before), while it 
attributes an underweight (-2.5%) to Industrials in case the ISM is below 50 and 
decreasing (i.e, if manufacturer’s expect a contraction at a faster pace than in the month 
before). Again, these overweights (underweights) are financed by small underweights 
(overweights) to all other equity sectors. 
Finally, the strategy also uses a systematic rule to eventually adjust its conviction to 
Financials against defensives.   Alessandri & Nelson (2012) found evidence of an effect 
                                                             
14 Measured by the Bloomberg Industrial Metals Subindex. 
of interest rates on bank profitability, as “in the long run, high yields and a steep yield 
curve boost banks’ income margins”. They also found evidence that banks seem to 
“borrow short and lend long”, and despite partly hedging this maturity mismatch, that 
“the slope of the yield curve matters positively for interest income”. Moreover, defensive 
sectors, with their counter-cyclical stance and frequently having higher dividend yields, 
act somewhat like bond proxies. Accordingly, the strategy gives an overweight (+2.5%) 
to Financials and an underweight (-2.5%) to Defensive sectors when there is a bear 
steepening in the yield curve15, and conversely an underweight (-2.5%) to Financials and 
an overweight (+2.5%) to Defensive sectors when there is a bull flattening in the yield 
curve16. 
Data and empirical results 
The data used was entirely collected from Bloomberg terminals. The results prove the 
robustness of the theoretical rationale behind the several factors described as relevant 
drivers of the different global equity sectors, as well as the benefits of their use in a 
strategy of global equity sector rotation. Therefore, through its application, it is possible 
to increase risk-adjusted returns compared to an equally-weighted or market-weighted 
portfolio of the same global equity sectors. Cumulative returns can be found in 
Appendixes 5 and 6.  
Note that the following sharpe ratios were computed by simply dividing the annual return 
by the annualized volatility, thus ignoring the use of a risk-free rate – which does not 
change the interpretation of risk-adjusted returns, since it should be seen as a comparison 
                                                             
15 Both 2Y UST yields and 10Y UST yield above its 12 months moving average, and the Yield Curve is 
steeper than in the previous month. 
16 Both 2Y UST yields and 10Y UST yields below its 12 months moving average, and the Yield Curve is 
flatter than in the previous month. 
of performances solely between this strategy and its benchmark. Returns are presented in 
euro terms, unless stated otherwise. 
The benchmark (i.e the equally weighted portfolio of the ten global GICS sectors) yields 
an average annual return of 5.4% with an annual volatility of 13.9%, and therefore a 
sharpe ratio of 0.39. On the other hand, the long-only strategy yields an average annual 
return of 6.2% with an annual volatility of 13.0%, increasing thus the sharpe ratio to 0.47. 
The maximum drawdown is also reduced relative to the benchmark, from 53% to 49%17. 
Finally, the annual average excess return relative to its benchmark is 0.6%18. Therefore, 
the long-only strategy leads to better risk-adjusted returns and also to a lower draw-down 
than its benchmark. 
Regarding the long-short strategy, the results are even more rewarding; it yields an 
average annual return of 8.3% with an annual volatility of 12.17% (sharpe ratio of 0.68). 
Furthermore, the maximum drawdown is reduced to 41%. The long-short strategy 
outperforms the benchmark with an annual average excess return of 2.3%. 
Thus far, the performance of this equity sector rotation strategy seems robustly better than 
the performance of its benchmark. Regardless, excess returns could have eventually be 
explained by some increase in risk-exposures to a certain risk-factor. To avoid this 
unintentional risk-misalignment, the strategy’s exposures were tested accordingly to the 
Global Market model and also the Carhart 4-factor model (Carhart, 1997). In order to do 
so, monthly returns for the risk-free asset, market risk premium, small minus big (SMB) 
portfolios, high minus low (HML) portfolios and the momentum factor (WML) were 
collected from the Kenneth R. French’s data library19. The risk-free rate was subtracted 
                                                             
17 Drawdown curves can be found in Appendixes 7 and 8. 
18 An average of the differences in annual returns between the strategy and the benchmark. 
19 For the rationale behind these factors, I recommend the reading of Fama & French (1996). 
from the strategy’s monthly returns, and these monthly excess returns were regressed 
according to the stated models.  
The results further support the robustness of the strategy20. Regarding the long-only 
strategy: its regression for the Global Market model has an R Square of 54%, a beta of 
0.65 (t Stat=17.3) and generates a monthly alpha (monthly abnormal return) of 0.06%; 
tested for the Carhart 4-factor model, it has an R Square of 89%, and loadings of 0.74 to 
the market risk premium (t Stat=40.44), -0.51 to the SMB factor (t Stat=-16.36), -0.18 to 
the HML factor (t Stat=-7.37), and -0.06 to the WML factor (t Stat=-3.69).  It generates 
a monthly alpha of 0.1%. Given that its deviations from the benchmark are somewhat 
restricted (compared to the “unrestricted” long-short strategy) and that it is a long-only 
strategy, it was expected that it would have some exposition to the market risk premium 
factor. Notably, it has negative expositions to the other three factors, even for the 
momentum factor, which is quite interesting since this strategy uses momentum as one of 
the signals to its allocations. So, good news are that its alpha is not generated by any 
exposition to these risk factors. Regarding the long-short strategy: its regression for the 
Global Market model has an R Square of 20%, a beta of 0.36 (t Stat=8.1) and generates a 
monthly alpha of 0.5%; tested for the Carhart 4-factor model, it has an R Square of 49%, 
and loadings of 0.47 to the market risk premium (t Stat=12.71), -0.64 to the SMB factor 
(t Stat=-10.31), -0.02  to the HML factor (t Stat=-0.44, i.e not statistically significant  at 
10% confidence level) and 0.13 to the WML (t Stat=3.70). It generates a monthly alpha 
of 0.4%. Not surprisingly, it has a lower exposition to the market risk premium since it is 
a long-short strategy (although positive as it is a net-long strategy). Even though the 
higher monthly alpha is encouraging, these results should be taken with a grain of salt. 
Conversely to the long-only strategy, one should be aware that its loading to the WML 
                                                             
20 Results can be found in Appendixes 1,2, 3 and 4. 
factor is now positive. Furthermore, the R Square for the long-short strategy is 
significantly lower than the one for the long-only strategy. As such, it might be the case 
that the abnormal returns for the long-short strategy are justified by an increase in some 
risk-exposure to a certain risk factor that is not considered in the Carhart 4-factor model, 
in particular for the short-positions of the strategy (for instance, the liquidity risk).  
Discussion 
After acknowledging the improvement in risk-adjusted returns, reduction in the 
maximum drawdown and the achievement of an overall outperformance relative to its 
benchmark, it is worthwhile to discuss some interesting patterns of the aforementioned 
performance of the equity rotation strategy. The figures about to be described refer to the 
long-only strategy; for the long-short strategy, the qualitative patterns are mostly the 
same, being just different in their amplitude.  
Firstly, the years in which the strategy has its greatest outperformance in relative terms 
to its benchmark are years of distress for equities21. Namely, in 2000, following the burst 
of the IT bubble, the benchmark has an annual return of -2.4% while the strategy yields 
an annual return of 2.4%. The symmetry is just a mere coincidence, but implies the 
greatest relative performance of the strategy during the backtest period (i.e, an 
outperformance of 4.8%). Just to framework, in that year: the MSCI World fell 14.1%; 
the MSCI Global IT tumbled 41.8%; and of the ten global GICS sectors, half recorded 
negative calendar returns. The second best relative performance of the backtested strategy 
occurred in 2008, the year of the global financial crisis: while the benchmark fell 36.8%, 
the long-only strategy returned a still sharp negative return of -33.1%, recording an 
outperformance of 3.7%. For an equity-only, long-only strategy (or net-long, in the case 
                                                             
21 Relative performance can be found in Appendixes 9 and 10. Relative performance for 2017 is limited 
to the extent of the backtest, given that data was only collected up to September 2017. 
of the long-short strategy), it would always be an harsh year: the MSCI World fell 42.1%, 
with all of the ten GICS Global Sectors having double-digit negative returns, despite a 
clear relative outperformance from Defensive sectors (the “best” performing index was 
the MSCI Global Health Care, with a calendar return of -22.9%).  
Conversely, the worst relative performance of the strategy occurred in 2009, partly 
missing the recovery in the year after the global financial crisis. While the benchmark 
returned +23.6% in that year, the equity rotation strategy underperformed by 3.8%, still 
recording a solid annual return of +19.8%. In 2009, the MSCI World gained 27.0%, and 
all of the ten sectors recorded a positive annual return, despite significant disparities 
across sectors due to a strong outperformance of Cyclical sectors. 
Thus, the equity rotation strategy seems to be favourable to the average risk-averse 
investor who dislikes drawdowns. In fact, and namely through the combination of 
momentum with low volatility and the incorporation of macroeconomic leading 
indicators, the strategy systematically positioned itself in favour of more defensive sectors 
ahead of broad negative equity returns leading to the significant mentioned 
outperformances in both 2000 and 2008. On the other hand, as exact market timing is 
nearly impossible, the strategy misses some of the positive returns in the recoveries that 
eventually follow market turmoils, usually led by Cyclical sectors. In other words, the 
strategy seems capable of favouring Defensive sectors ahead of financial crises, but tends 
to stay too long with that conviction which makes it miss the initial rally in Cyclicals. 
Over the long-term, however, the strategy indeed seems capable of increasing risk-
adjusted returns, while simultaneously reducing portfolio drawdowns.  
Regarding the exposures of the strategy to additional risk-factors suggested in the Carhart 
4-factor model, the results also look encouraging. Firstly, the alpha is positive after 
controlling for those four factors. More significantly, further than the fact that strategy 
abnormal returns are not a result from the exposure to those risk factors, they also seem 
to be either negatively correlated (eventually providing a protection against them) or 
uncorrelated (without significant exposure) to such factors – with the obvious exception 
of the significant positive exposure to the market risk premium, since this is an equity-
only strategy and that the long-short strategy is a net-long strategy. On the other hand, the 
enthusiastic results for the long-short strategy should be taken carefully, potentially 
indicating a subject for future research: its R Square is significantly lower than the R 
Square for the long-only strategy’s returns regression. As such, the short-positions of the 
strategy might be exposed to some risk factors (for instance, liquidity risk) that are not 
being considered. 
One should note that the aforementioned results were reached by avoiding sources of 
overfitting. Factors were chosen either by economic intuition or by using previous related 
research. That said, all factors included added value to the strategy, ceteris paribus 
(departing from the benchmark, performance increases when backtesting each factor 
independently). Remarkably, the interaction of factors also seems to work in favour of an 
efficient equity sector rotation, leading to the aforementioned overall relative 
outperformance. 
It is also worth noting that there were tested some factors that were expected to increase 
the outperformance of the strategy. Namely some fundamental ones, such as earnings 
growth, sales growth or capacity utilization, or other leading macroeconomic indicators, 
such as initial jobless claims. Nevertheless the conviction that such factors could indeed 
play a role in an equity sector rotation strategy, the ones just mentioned are often subject 
to post-release revisions. Therefore, one would commit a forward-looking bias by using 
a time-series of those factors, while the gathering of unrevised factors would be less 
straightforward. Furthermore, by having the conviction that the momentum/low volatility 
combination already includes significant information about the fundamentals of each 
sector (in other words, positive public information weighted against negative public 
information should be immediately reflected in the price) and that the macroeconomic 
scenarios constructed were already quite robust, such factors were not included in the 
final strategy.  
Conclusion 
This paper details the rationale behind the factors that are believed to be relevant drivers 
to equity sectors. Then, it details the methodology behind a strategy to act upon those 
factors. The performance of such strategy shows that a systematic rotation across global 
equity sectors improves risk-adjusted returns. It is shown that: a combination of 
momentum with low volatility reduces the tail-risk of momentum investing, adding to 
previous research that industry momentum is a significant driver of returns; a distinction 
between defensive and cyclical sectors, followed by the consequent systematic fine-
tuning of sector allocation according to the identified macroeconomic scenario, improves 
the strategy’s performance; and that some sectors have key specific drivers, and its 
systematic use contributes to ensure that, for instance, the recorded momentum is 
justified, or that the generalization into cyclical/defensive sector is not distorted (as an 
illustration, a regular economic expansion would most likely benefit Financials, but the 
relationship would not be so linear if that expansion is being driven by Central Banks 
consistently lowering policy rates). 
Impact in the business world and discussion of future research 
If globalisation and financial markets integration do continue to increase over time, one 
could argue that the country effect (in the sense of the risk-premium obtained by 
allocating capital to equities of a certain country) would have a lower relevance for 
explaining returns; conversely, as political boundaries become less important and factors 
of production move more freely, the risk factors that drive various industries might gain 
more relevance. 
This paper does not argue against country allocation: currently, country effects are a very 
significant driver of returns – and will likely continue to be. What this paper aims to point 
out for further discussion is that, having identified potential key industry drivers and being 
shown that one can systematically act upon them to efficiently rotate across global 
sectors, a “pure” industry allocation might actually improve a “pure” country allocation.  
Sometimes investors might want to make a bet on a certain country based on their 
expectations of country effects, but unintentionally be making a bet on (and being 
exposed to) a significant industry risk: an overweight in Australia is implicitly an 
overweight to natural resources, and an overweight in the United States might well be an 
implicit overweight to Information Technology, given the predominance of these 
industries in such countries. Future research could focus on whether a systematic sector 
rotation only works when applied to global equities or if, on the other hand, it does add 
value when combined with a systematic country allocation. Intuitively, a simple overlap 
of both approaches might not make that much sense (take a potential scenario in which 
the overall Italian economy would be expected to accelerate at the same time that global 
Financials would be expected to outperform, but Italian banks, due to their idiosyncrasies, 
could actually underperform in such scenario), but a not so linear combination could 
actually work (for instance, only overweight US equities if one expects both the US 
economy and the IT sector to outperform). 
Admittedly, this paper does not take into consideration transaction costs. That was not a 
major cause of concern since the main purpose of this study was to robustly identify 
global equity sector drivers, instead of building a strict “investment fund”. Furthermore, 
allocations are made on a monthly basis, and some a posteriori analysis show that the 
strategy’s active weights in each sector often do not change abruptly (i.e, from month to 
month convictions are often qualitatively similar even if active weights change at the 
margin). Thus, even if transaction costs were a concern in applying the exact active 
weights computed by the systematic strategy, one could just change the active weights on 
its portfolio when the ones suggested by the strategy change abruptly on a monthly basis 
(or when the qualitative conviction on a sector changes, for example). Nevertheless, 
future research on transaction costs could be interesting, namely if an individual investor 
(instead of an institutional investor) wants to apply such strategy.  
On equity sectors, future research could deepen the use of these factors in industries (there 
are 68 industries defined by the GICS) instead of sectors (the 10 used in this paper, 
excluding real estate). Thus, one would test whether a greater specification would add 
value by more concretely identifying specific drivers to more similar firms or if, on the 
other hand, such specification would mean a loss of generality making it harder to identify 
robust drivers (in the limit it would be a stock picking strategy). Furthermore, a factor 
could be included to accommodate structural changes in the economy: for instance, the 
health care sector has been historically defensive, but as the biotech industry market 
weight emerges (relatively recent market tendency) one could argue that it could turn into 
a more neutral or even cyclical sector; thus, one could test the use of a factor similar to a 
rolling beta to control the eventual structural change of a certain sector/industry. 
Finally, future research would also be enlightening regarding whether fund selection 
could improve the systematic sectoral allocation, using funds different than the MSCI 
benchmarks. This was not tested in this paper in order to properly address whether the 
strategy’s performance was obtained via the pure sectoral allocation (otherwise it would 
not be a significant test of an equity sectors rotation strategy), but being shown that these 
sectoral convictions will likely lead to overall outperformance, one can now test whether 
it can be further improved with a contribution from a rigorous selection of funds that 
invest in each equity industry.  
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Appendix 1 – Global Market model for the long-only strategy 
 









df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.196703578 0.196703578 299.1797949 4.95282E-45
Residual 258 0.169628845 0.000657476
Total 259 0.366332424
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.000664046 0.001601531 0.414631708 0.678756077 -0.002489692 0.003817783 -0.002489692 0.003817783
Mkt-RF 0.64754254 0.037437098 17.29681459 4.95282E-45 0.573821355 0.721263725 0.573821355 0.721263725








df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 4 0.328418905 0.082104726 552.2226852 2.9106E-124
Residual 255 0.037913519 0.00014868
Total 259 0.366332424
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.001311014 0.000774111 1.693574599 0.091567252 -0.00021345 0.002835478 -0.00021345 0.002835478
Mkt-RF 0.746597531 0.018462468 40.43866417 6.3985E-113 0.710239198 0.782955864 0.710239198 0.782955864
SMB -0.507393186 0.031010527 -16.36196589 1.25069E-41 -0.568462545 -0.446323828 -0.568462545 -0.446323828
HML -0.180208635 0.024458534 -7.367924464 2.40634E-12 -0.228375085 -0.132042184 -0.228375085 -0.132042184
WML -0.064665829 0.017515116 -3.69200111 0.000272123 -0.099158533 -0.030173125 -0.099158533 -0.030173125
SUMMARY OUTPUT [CARHAR GLOBAL 4FACTOR MODEL - LONG ONLY STRATEGY]
Appendix 3 – Global Market model for the long-short strategy 
 










df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.061101187 0.061101187 65.89750165 1.95672E-14
Residual 258 0.239221608 0.000927216
Total 259 0.300322796
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.005087563 0.001901892 2.675001643 0.007950608 0.001342356 0.008832771 0.001342356 0.008832771
Mkt-RF 0.360900097 0.044458266 8.117727616 1.95672E-14 0.273352817 0.448447377 0.273352817 0.448447377








df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 4 0.146861799 0.03671545 61.00859447 4.20707E-36
Residual 255 0.153460996 0.000601808
Total 259 0.300322796
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.004004579 0.001557417 2.57129479 0.010699598 0.000937541 0.007071617 0.000937541 0.007071617
Mkt-RF 0.472029336 0.03714426 12.70800222 5.43488E-29 0.398880753 0.545177919 0.398880753 0.545177919
SMB -0.643385487 0.062389443 -10.31240955 4.55589E-21 -0.766249676 -0.520521297 -0.766249676 -0.520521297
HML -0.021644999 0.049207623 -0.439870839 0.660403234 -0.118550092 0.075260094 -0.118550092 0.075260094
WML 0.130535053 0.035238303 3.704351299 0.00025985 0.061139891 0.199930216 0.061139891 0.199930216
SUMMARY OUTPUT [CARHAR GLOBAL 4FACTOR MODEL - LONG SHORT STRATEGY]








   
 




































Appendix 10 – Annual relative performance for the long-short strategy 
Year
Annual returns of the long-
only strategy in €
Annual returns of the 
benchmark in €
Out/Underperformance
1996 13.8% 12.4% 1.4%
1997 32.3% 31.0% 1.3%
1998 14.8% 13.6% 1.2%
1999 34.7% 36.8% -2.1%
2000 2.4% -2.4% 4.8%
2001 -10.9% -11.0% 0.1%
2002 -30.1% -32.3% 2.3%
2003 5.7% 7.5% -1.8%
2004 6.8% 6.3% 0.5%
2005 23.0% 22.3% 0.7%
2006 7.5% 7.2% 0.3%
2007 2.8% 1.4% 1.4%
2008 -33.1% -36.8% 3.7%
2009 19.8% 23.6% -3.8%
2010 17.4% 17.4% -0.1%
2011 -1.0% -3.1% 2.1%
2012 8.1% 9.0% -0.9%
2013 18.7% 17.2% 1.6%
2014 17.3% 16.0% 1.3%
2015 5.4% 4.9% 0.5%
2016 9.1% 10.7% -1.6%
2017 -0.6% -0.2% -0.4%
Year
Annual returns of the long-
short strategy in €
Annual returns of the 
benchmark in €
Out/Underperformance
1996 18.0% 12.4% 5.7%
1997 36.2% 31.0% 5.2%
1998 18.2% 13.6% 4.7%
1999 28.4% 36.8% -8.5%
2000 17.8% -2.4% 20.2%
2001 -11.1% -11.0% -0.2%
2002 -23.3% -32.3% 9.0%
2003 0.3% 7.5% -7.2%
2004 8.3% 6.3% 2.0%
2005 25.2% 22.3% 2.9%
2006 8.2% 7.2% 1.0%
2007 7.0% 1.4% 5.6%
2008 -21.0% -36.8% 15.8%
2009 8.8% 23.6% -14.8%
2010 17.0% 17.4% -0.5%
2011 5.1% -3.1% 8.1%
2012 5.3% 9.0% -3.7%
2013 23.6% 17.2% 6.4%
2014 21.2% 16.0% 5.2%
2015 6.9% 4.9% 2.0%
2016 4.1% 10.7% -6.5%
2017 -1.8% -0.2% -1.6%
